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DESPERATELY SEEKING STATUS: SAME-SEX COUPLES BATTLE FOR
EMPLOYMENT-LINKED BENEFITS
INTRODUCTION
Try to imagine the following scenario. Acouple has moved to a new city and bought
a home. This couple has a relationship reaching back twelve years. They do all the things
that married couples typically do. Although they have no children, they are planning to
adopt a child. They intermingle their financial affairs. They have ajoint mortgage,joint
credit cards and joint bank accounts. They have wills that name each other as executors
and primary beneficiaries. They also have durable powers of attorney over each other
for medical care. These two individuals have set their lives up as a family.
One member of the couple starts a new job and is handed the usual array of group
insurance forms. The employee lists his partner on the benefits forms as his spouse. A
few days later, a staff person from employer's benefits office calls the employee. The
staff person asks, somewhat awkwardly, if the employee inadvertently made a mistake
on his benefit forms because he indicated that his spouse is male. The employee
responds that there has been no mistake. A few days later, the employee's benefit
applications are returned and stamped "DEPENDENT BENEFITS DENIED.
SINGLE COVERAGE ONLY."'
For a married heterosexual employee similarly situated to the employee in the
foregoing scenario, this kind of unilateral denial of dependent benefits would not likely
occur. In addition, proof of marriage would almost never be required in order to sign
up an opposite-sex spouse for benefits offered as part of an employment compensation
package.' The scenario described above is becoming commonplace as more same-sex
couples4 try to secure employment-linked benefits5 for their same-sex partners. 6
' This hypothetical is a composite of the information collected in discussions with same-sex couples. Any similarity
to individual cases is coincidental.
2 See Rebecca L Melton, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving
Definitions of "Family," 29 J. FAM. L 497,516 (1990-91). "Same-sex and heterosexual cohabitants still struggle
for health insurance, dental insurance, eye care, life insurance, bereavement leave, pensions, sick leave, social
security, membership in clubs; all benefits that married couples can receive practically automatically." Id.
' In random telephone calls to 25 employers employing more than 100 employees in Summit and Portage Counties,
none required proof of marriage for an employee to sign up a spouse within 30 days of marriage or during appropriate
enrollment periods, even if the couple did not use the same last name.
' This Comment uses the term "same-sex couple" to refer to any gay or lesbian couple engaged in a committed, long-
term relationship.
I This Comment uses the term "employment-linked benefits" to refer to all employee benefits that may arise out of
the employment relationship. These benefits include but may not be limited to health and dental insurance, life
insurance, various types of leave, Social Security, workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, and pen-
sion or retirement plans.
6 This Comment uses the term "same-sex partner" to refer to each member of a gay or lesbian couple. Each member
of the couple stands in the place of a spouse to the other member as in a marriage.
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For example, a professor at a mid-sized, state-funded university in Ohio is currently
preparing for a labor arbitration over the denial of benefits to his same-sex domestic
partner7 of 14 years The professor's grievance alleges that the University's denial of
benefits to his same-sex partner is a direct violation of the nondiscrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation clause recently-negotiated into the faculty's collective bargaining
agreement.9 The university's action also allegedly violates similar clauses that appear in
university policy documents. 10 Arbitration hearings in this case will be scheduled before
the end of 1993.
See Robert L. Elbin, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay
Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067,1069 n. Il (1990). One commentator has defined the term domestic
partner as follows:
The definition of "domestic partner" varies widely across these programs that recognize domestic
partnership status .... Given its broadest definition, however, a domestic partnership would include
any two persons who reside togetherand who rely on each other for financial and emotional support.
Some definitions presume a sexual relationship between the parties. .. however, a sexual relation-
ship is not a requirement.... [Wihile domestic partnership is the most widely-used term in benefit
programs, other descriptives include "named partner" and "significant other."
Id
a American Association of University Professors Kent State Chapter v. Kent State University, No. 53-300-00359-
93, Lab. Arb. (filed July 20, 1993; hearing date Dec. 7, 1993). (on file with the American Arbitration Association,
Middleburg Heights, Ohio and arising from faculty grievance #G-923-U I filed on behalf of Dr. Robert Johnson for
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
9 Intent and Purpose, COLLECHVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN KENT STATE UNIVERSITY AND THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, September 16, 1992 at 1 provides in pertinent part:
The parties endorse Kent State University's commitment to the achievement of optimal conditions
of intellectual discovery, human development, and responsible social change and recognize that it
can best recognize these goals within an atmosphere of freedom and fairness. To these ends the
parties reaffrmn their belief in the moral and legal principles supporting a University environment
free of decisions and judgments based on race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, national origin,
or sexual orientation.
Id. (emphasis added).
10 EQUALOPPORTUN1TY (UP) [6-01] §3346-6-01 KentState Universitypolicyregardingequalopportunityprovides
in pertinent part:
In employmentitis the policy of this university thatthere shall beno unlawful discrimination against
any employee or applicant employee because of... sexual orientation. Such policy shall apply to,
but not necessarily be limited to, the following: employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer,
recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other compensation;
and selection for training, including apprenticeship.
Id. at §3346-6-1(A)(2) (emphasis added).
See also DIVERSITY AT KENT STATE UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE UNIVERSrrY-WIDE DIVERSITY PLANNING
COMMITTEE 40 (Mar. 1, 1993). The report makes recommendations for increasing diversity at the University and
specifically mentions the extension of health benefits to unmarried partners as follows:
Development begins on a comprehensive action plan for the recruitment and retention of under-
represented faculty and staff, a plan which includes recruitment and hiring strategies, professional
faculty and staff development programs, development of a faculty and staff handbook emphasizing
diversity issues, faculty and staff awards, extension of benefits to non-married partners, and an
outcomes assessment instrument to monitor progress on a continuing basis.
Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 27:2
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The outcome of this arbitration will be decided in a state legislative atmosphere
which has been less than sensitive to gay rights." Recently, 14 legislators 2 in the Ohio
House of Representatives sponsored a bill' 3 designed to prohibit any of Ohio's state-
funded universities from allowing same-sex couples to live in university housing. 4 The
bill also explicitly prohibits all state-funded universities from providing insurance benefits to
the same-sex partners of state university employees. 5 In another example of some of the
official hostility expressed towards gay and lesbian issues, a State Senator has publicly threat-
ened the same university charged in the aforementioned arbitration with cuts to state subsidy
allotments if the university's plans forintroducing a new gay studies course are implemented. 6
11 See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. Ohio's State Representatives introduced House Bill 422 during
the 1993-94 Regular Session. This bill excludes same-sex couples from living in university housing. The Bill also
expressly prohibits state universities from offering "insurance or any other coverage" to a non-employerpartner who
is the same sex as the employee.
At present, Ohio affords legal status to "domestic partners," either of the same or opposite sex, in cases involving
domestic violence. See Deacon v. Landers, 587 N.E. 2d 395 (Ohio Ct.App. 1990) (granting applicant protection order
against former domestic partner). The court bases its holding on Orio REV. CODEANN. §3113.3 l(A)( 1)(Anderson
1989) which defines domestic violence as specific acts against a family or household member and OHO REV. CODE
ANN. §3113.31 (A)(3)(Anderson 1989) which defines household members as "a spouse or person living as a spouse
of the respondent,... or one who has otherwise cohabited with the respondent within one year prior to the date of
the alleged act of domestic violence." Id. at 397.
12 Representatives Fox(R),Amstutz(R), Brading(R), Haines(R), Hodges(R), Johnson(R), Kasputis(R), Netzley(R),
Schuring (R), Sines(R), Terwilleger(R), VanVyven(R), Wachtmann(R), and Wise(R) sponsored Ohio H.B. 442.
11 H.B. No. 442, Ohio 120th General Assembly, Regular Session (1993-94).
14 Id. The bill provides in pertinent part:
§3345.43 [of the Ohio Revised Code]. (A) A Board of Trustees of a state university or college as
defmed in Division (A)(1) of §3345.12 of the Revised Code, or an administrator authorized by the
Board, may establish or designate one or more particular residential facilities owned or controlled
by the university for both of the following:
(1) legally married couples and any dependent children;
(2) unmarried or legally separated parent, when such parents are residing with dependent children.
(B) If a university facility is established or designated pursuant to Division (A) of this Section, no
persons shall be permitted to reside in such facility unless such persons are described by Division
(A)(1) or (2) of this Section.
Id.
Is Id. The bill provides in pertinent part:
§3345.42 [of the Ohio Revised Code]. No Board of Trustees of a state university or college as
defined in Division (A)(1) of §3345.12 of the Revised Code shall include in any policy or contract
that provides insurance or other coverage as described in Division (A)(1) of §9.90 of the Revised
Code a non-employee who is the same sex partner of an employee of the institution.
Id.
" See Roger J. Mezger, KSU's Course on GaysAngers Senator, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, July 21, 1993, at A 12.(According to this article, Ohio's State Senator Gary Suhadolnik, a Republican from Parma Heights sent a letter to
Dr. Carol Cartwright, President of Kent State University, on the subject of Kent State University adding a gay studies
course to its curriculum. In this letter, Senator Suhadolnik suggested that "the move [to approve a course devoted
to studying homosexuality] could hurt the university in six months or so, when the legislature is likely to adjust the
state budget."). See also Jill Elish, Senator Targets Gay Class, RECORD-COURIER, July 21, 1993, at Al; Jill Elish,
Cartwright Defends Gay Course, RECORD-COURIER, July 22,1993, at A I (quoting State Senator Gary Suhadolnik,
"Homosexuality bothers me. I'm not advocating violence against them or that they be discriminated against, but I
don't think that homosexuals should get special treatment.").
Fall,1993]
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Not all gay and lesbian employees face discriminatory treatment when they apply
to secure dependent benefits for their same-sex partners.17 However, same-sex couples
have realized few victories." State and federal case law on this issue is scattered through-
out the country and holdings tend to be fact-specific. 9 To date, the United States
Supreme Court has not heard a case dealing with an employer's duty to provide employ-
ment-linked benefits to the same-sex partners of gay and lesbian employees. Only
recently, through an occasional administrative ruling, agencies have pushed employers
to extend policies of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to include the
granting of employment-linked benefits to the same-sex partners of gay and lesbian
employees.1°
This Comment will focus on the battles that gay and lesbian workers face in their
attempts to attain benefit parity in the workplace and how these battles are linked to the
fact that their relationships lack legal status. Part I will discuss recent judicial decisions
on the issue of employment-linked benefit availability to the same-sex partners of gay
and lesbian employees. Part II will review two recent decisions, which although unre-
lated to employment, may have set the stage for a legal redefinition of the family, and
may provide a means by which same-sex couples could attain the legal status required
to guarantee employment-linked benefits for their partners. Part Ill will briefly outline
other legal mechanisms same-sex couples are currently using to formalize their relation-
ships. Part IV will discuss how one lesbian employee was successful in attaining
employment-linked health benefits for her same-sex partner and the need for a uniform
resolution to this issue across jurisdictions.
17 See Alan W. Richardson, Sexual OrientationRights in the Workplace: A Proposalfor Revising and Reconsidering
California's Assembly Bill 101, 26 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 425,429-30 (1993). He writes:
In California and across the nation, employment discrimination based on sexual orientation is
pervasive. Studies reveal that as many as 30% of gay workers experience discrimination at work;
up to 17% have been fired because of their lifestyle. Employers discriminate against sexual orien-
tation minorities by rejecting their applications for employment or by firing employees thought or
known to be attracted to members of the same gender. Employers similarly discriminate against
sexual orientation minorities by failing to promote them and refusing to extend employment benefits
to their domestic partners.
Id. (emphasis added).
" See generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L REV. 311 (1980-
8 1) [hereinafterRiveraRecent Developments]; and see generally Rhonda R. Rivera, QueerLaw: Sexual Orientation
Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part I, 11 U. DAYTON L REV. 275 (1986) [hereinafter Rivera, Queer Law] (discussion of
case law arising from employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
'9 See cases cited infra notes 28-84 and accompnying text. Part I of this Comment discusses six cases from 1982-
1993 which address the issue of whether the same-sex partners of gay and lesbian employees are entitled to receive
employment-linked benefits.
20 See, e.g., administrative ruling cited infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text. This Comment discusses a June
1993 decision by the Vermont Labor Relations Board holding that the University of Vermont was required to provide
the same health benefit coverage to the same-sex partners of employees as was being provided to the spouses of
married employees.
[Vol. 27:2
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PART I - BLIND ALLEYS
A body of case law on the granting of employment-linked benefits to the same-sex
partners of gay and lesbian employees is growing, but the holdings have been mixed, and
few have been in favor of same-sex partners receiving employment-linked benefits.2"
The courts are still routinely denyingthe same-sex partners of gay and lesbian employees
government and employer-provided benefits.22 In most cases that go to trial, the same-
sex couple asserts that this denial of benefits is discriminatory on the basis of sexual
orientation or marital status.23 To date, courts have been disinclined to agree with this
argument.24 Meanwhile, almost daily, legislatures enact domestic partnership ordi-
nances 25 and gay rights legislation.' To date, this piecemeal approach has not provided
the legal status same-sex couples need so that employers are required to extend benefits
to the same-sex partners of gay and lesbian employees. 27 The following cases offer a
framework of existing case law on this issue.
Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Board of California: Workers' Compensation
Benefits Granted
In Donovan v. Workers' CompensationBoard of California,2I after a lengthy battle,29
the plaintiff was awarded a $25,000 death benefit. The court held that because the benefit
involved was statutory, the plaintiff, as a gay person, could be classified as a "good faith
member of another's household." Plaintiff Earl Donovan was the live-in companion
of Thomas Finnerty.3 Finnerty was injured on the job and was later determined to be
one-hundred-percent disabled.3 2 Finnerty was seriously depressed about his disability
and later died after a suicide attempt.3 Donovan filed this action alleging that because
2' See cases cited infra notes 28-84 and accomanying text.
" See Melton, supra note 2, at 516.
See cases cited infra notes 28-84 and accomanying text.
24 ld
I See generally Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A Legal Analysis of Domestic
Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (1992) (discussion of existing domestic partnership legislation).
See also LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW 439-442 (William B. Rubenstein, ed., 1993) (reprint of San Francisco
Domestic Partnership Ordinance of January 15, 1991).
25 See LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW, supra note 25, at 268-270 (reprint of Massachusetts Gay Rights Law
and a list of states and municipalities which have enacted gay rights legislation).
" See Bowman & Comish, supra note 25, at 1165. "The lack of legally recognized alternatives to marriage and the
exclusion of lesbians and gay men from marriage has left many couples unable to define their relationships as they
chose, and has led to disparate and unfair treatment of similarly situated couples." Id.
2, 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. CL App. 1982).
Id. at 870-71. See also Rivera, Queer Law, supra note 18, at 385 (full discussion of the Donovan case).
30 Donovan, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 873. "Labor Code §3502 reads in part: 'No person is a dependent of any deceased
employee unless in good faith a member of the family or household of the employee .... ' Id.
31 Id. at 870.
32 Id.
33 Id.
Fall,1993]
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of his disabling injury Finnerty developed suicidal tendencies, and as a result, his sub-
sequent death was work-related.3
In the first hearing, the Workers' Compensation Board held that the relationship
between Donovan and Finnerty was "illicit," and therefore Donovan could not be a
"good faith member of Finnerty's household." ' The Board awarded Donovan limited
medical costs.' Donovan appealed the Board's decision to the California Court of
Appeals, which remanded the decision stating that the Board had purposely avoided the
issue of dependency. 7 Finally, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board based its
decision on the highly-publicized Marvin v. Marvins8 decision and ruled that Donovan
was a good faith memberofFinnerty's household and his total dependent.39 The Donovan
court recognized the possibility that a gay person could be a "good faith member of
another's household," and as a result, that individual could be classified as an employee's
dependent under the workers' compensation statutory definition.'
Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration: Dental Benefits Denied
In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration,t the California Court of
Appeals held that the same-sex partner of a state employee was not entitled to dependent
coverage under the State Employees' Dental Care Act 2 Boyce Hinman and his partner
of over 12 years, Larry Beatty, owned their home together, placed their assets in a joint
bank account, and were each other's primary beneficiaries in their wills and life insur-
ance policies.43 The couple had entered into a covenant of mutual economic support and
told the court that they would marry if they were not prohibited from doing so by
state law." Hinman identified Beatty as his "family partner" on his dental enrollment
34 Id.
I ld at 873. See also Rivera, Queer Law, supra note 18, at 385.
36 Donovan, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
37 Id.
3s Marvin v. Marvin, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. 1976). See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
19 Donovan, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 872. See also Rivera, Queer Law, supra note 18 at 385.
'o Donovan, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 873. The court held:
Recognizing the obvious, the only petitioners for worker's [sic] compensation benefits are the
employee and dependents. Labor Code section 3503 reads in part: 'No person is a dependent of
any deceased employee unless in good faith a member of the family or household of the
employee....' At the threshold of any award by the Board must be the finding that the petitioner
qualifies under the code definition of dependent. In the instant case, no such finding exists, however,
the Board made an award in favorof petitioner 'of medical-legal costs and an amount to be adjusted.'
Id. at 873.
41 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
42 Id. at 419.
43 Id. at 412.
44/d.
[Vol. 27:2
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form.4 The following day, the employer informed Hinman that Beatty's coverage was
denied.46 In denying the coverage, the Department of Personnel Administration relied
on the definition of "family member" as provided for in the Public Employees' Medical
and Dental Care Act.47
Hinman argued that the denial of Beatty's benefits unlawfully discriminated against
homosexual employees who do not have the legal option to marry.4s The court agreed
with the employer and held that the denial of benefits to Beatty was not discriminatory
because the Department of Personnel Administration's policy had not classified Hinman
on the basis of sexual orientation. 49 The court pointed out that no differences in dental
benefits given to homosexual and heterosexual unmarried state employees existed.'
The court ruled that the Dental Care Act, as applied by Hinman's employer, distinguished
between married and unmarried employees and that Hinman and his partner's "real
quarrel is with the California legislature if they wish to legitimize the status of a homo-
sexual partner. 51
The Hinman decision was crucial to the development of gay legal protection beyond
the outcome of that case alone.52 By not granting Hinman review, the California Su-
preme Court established a strong precedent confirming that the state's denial of partner
I d. at 412 n.2. The court rejected the lower court's definition of "family partner" as follows:
Hinman identified Beatty as his "family partner" in his dental plan enrollment authorization form.
In its ruling the trial court stated it adopted this nomenclature"... to refer to an individual living with
a State employee in a 'loving relationship' having many of the attributes of marriage without benefit
of the legal status of marriage ... " We decline to use the term, as it carries a conclusory implication
of family relationship, yet is not established by blood relationship or the operation of law.
Id.
46 Id. at 412.
I d. at 416. The court limited the eligibility of dependents under the dental plan as follows:
Thenegotiated terms of the state dental plan limit eligibility for benefits offainly members, thereby
excluding all non-spouses or other unmarried non-children, of both the opposite and the same sex.
Homosexuals are simply a part of the larger class of unmarried persons, to which also belong the
employees' filial relations and parents, for example.
Id.
1s Id. at 415.
49 Id. at 416 n.8. "As we do not find any classification based on homosexuality in this legislative and administrative
scheme, we need not discuss whether sexual orientation ought to be the basis of a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause." Id.
Id. at 416. See also supra note 40.
' Id. at 419-20.
n See Rivera, Queer Law, supra note 18, at 386-88 (discussion of Hinman v. Dep't of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal.
Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
Fall,1993]
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benefits to gay and lesbian employees does not violate employment policy and statutory
protections forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.3
Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transportation: Bereavement Leave Denied
Another case involving employment-linked benefits is Brinkin v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Company.' Brinkin worked as a railroad clerk.55 When his same-sex
partner of eleven years died, the railroad refused to grant him funeral benefit leave.56
Brinkin's employer made this benefit available automatically to married employees.5
Brinkin's union denied his grievance and he subsequently sued his union and his em-
ployer.58 In federal court, Brinkin alleged that the employer's denial of funeral benefits
violated his privacy rights under the California Constitution, violated the California Fair
Employment Act and Housing Act, and also violated the San Francisco police code.59
The District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction in the case and remanded the
action back to state court.6
When the case finally reached the California Court of Appeals, the court held that
employers may lawfully grant to married persons benefits which are unavailable to
unmarried partners.6' Like the courts in Hinman and Phillips, the Brinkin court upheld
an employer's denial of employment-linked benefits to an employee's same-sex part-
ner. 2 The court classified Brinkin as a single adult male and not the immediate family
member of his domestic partner Robert Reich.63
-1 See John C. Beattie, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the Protection of Unmarried
Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.. 1415, 1450-52 (1991). He writes:
Although the gay plaintiffin Hinman did not prevail on his claim, the court's decision suggests that
in the absence of an express exception, health plans that provide additional benefits for spouses of
married employees but not the partners of unmarried employees would be found to violate the
prohibition against martial status discrimination.
Id. at 1451.
5 572 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
-5 Id. at 237.
56 Id.
Id.
st Id.
59 Id.
6 Id. at 238.
61 See Elbin supra note 7 at 1079 and n. 105-110 (discussion of the unpublished Brinkin v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., No.
A034147, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) decision).
6 Id.
0 Id. Elbin writes: "The court of appeals again decided the issue was whether Southern Pacific's action unlawfully
discriminated against unmarried employees. As far as the court was concerned, Brinkin's intimate relationship with
Reich was of no consequence." Id.
[Vol. 27:2
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Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission:Medical Benefits Denied
In Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission," the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
held that an employer can limit dependent health insurance coverage without violating
marital status, sexual orientation, orothergender-based provisions of the Wisconsin Fair
EmploymentAct.6 Jerri-Linn Phillips brought this action against her employer after the
employer denied dependent health insurance coverage to Lorri Tommerup, her lesbian
companion.6 The court held that under Wisconsin law, Phillips had no legal relationship
to Tommerup and, as a result, the law imposed no mutual duty of general support, and
no responsibility for the provision of medical care on unmarried couples of any gender,
as it does on married persons.67
The court ruled that Phillips's insurance application was denied not because of her
sexual orientation, but because the person to whom she wished coverage extended was
not her spouse.6 As in the Hinman decision,69 the court placed Phillips in the same
category as all unmarried heterosexual males and females.7° The court went further to
say, "We also note in this regard thatwhile there is, admittedly, disparate treatment in this
case, not all disparate treatment is discriminatory, but it is only where similarly situated
persons are treated differently that discrimination is an issue."71
482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 123. The court relied on a Wisconsin statute as follows:
Section 40.02(20), Stats., defines "dependent" for the purposes of the employee trust fund: "De-
pendent" means spouse, minor child, including stepchildren of the current marriage dependent on
the employee for support and maintenance, or child of any age, including stepchildren of the current
marriage if handicapped .... For group insurance purposes only, the department may promulgate
rules with a different definition of "dependent" than the one otherwise provided in this section.
Exercising the rle-making authority delegated to it by sec. 40.02(2), Stats., the departmnent adopted
a rule (Wis.Adm. Code sec. ETF 10.01 (2)(b)) defining "dependent" for health insurance purposes
as: "An employee's spouse and an employee's unmarried child who is dependent upon the employee
or the employee's former spouse for at least 50% of support and maintenance....
Id. at 124 n.2.
Id at 123. The court upheld the Commission's interpretation of the applicable statute as follows:
We conclude first that the commission... could reasonably interpret the applicable statute and rule
as legitimately limiting dependent health insurance coverage to employees' spouses and children
without violating the marital status discrimination provisions of the act. We also conclude that the
commission and the trial court correctly dismissed Phillips's claims ... because the rule applies
equally to hetero- and homosexual employees and thus does notdiscriminate against the lattergroup
... nor does the rule treat one gender differently than the other, it applies equally to males and
females.
Id.
67 Id.
Id. at 126.
See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
7 Phillips, 482 N.W.2d at 126.
71 Id.
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The court's holding in the Phillips case followed the same rationale that the court
used in Hinman. In Phillips, the judge reasoned that the disparity in treatment was the
result of marital status and not sexual orientation.' The courts in Phillips and Hinman
refused to grant unmarried same-sex couples the same access to employment-linked
benefits that married couples take for granted.73
Rovira v. AT & T: Death Benefits Denied
In a recent New York case, Rovira v. AT & T,74 Sandra Rovira, the lesbian partner of
a deceased AT &T employee sued the company for not paying survivor benefits to her
and her two children under her domestic partner's employee's benefit plan.75 Rovira
claimed that she and her own children who had all been living with the AT & T employee
were entitled to benefits under theEmploymentRetirement Income SecurityAct (ERISA)76
and AT & T employment policy 7  Her complaint alleged that AT & T discriminated
7 Phillips, 482 N.W.2d at 126. "[Tlhe fact that Phillips regards Tommemp as her 'spouse equivalent' does not make
her 'similarly situated' to a married employee in the context of a discuimination analysis." Id.
73 See Melton, supra note 2, at 516.
1' 817 F Supp 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
75 Id. at 1064.
1 Id. The court reviewed the employee benefit plan for a definition of possible beneficiaries as follows:
As an AT & T sales manager, Forlini was covered under the Plan, an employee benefit plan covered
under ERISA that provides for payment of a Sickness Death Benefit to the eligible beneficiaries of
deceased employees who participated in the Plan. The Plan limits eligible beneficiaries to three
categories of persons: "the spouse and the dependent children and other dependent relatives of the
deceased."
Id. at 1064-65.
29 U.S.C. §1002(8) Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 provides in pertinent part: "The term
'beneficiary' means a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id.
Id. at 1067. In discussing AT& T's employment policies the court says:
In the Personnel Guide AT & Tdefmes equal opportunity in general to mean "that all employment
decisions are made and personnel policies are administered without discrimination on the basis of
... sexual preference or orientation [or] marital status...." The Personnel Guide then explains that
it is At&T's particularpolicy to "prohibit unlawful discrimination.. because of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age.., in any employment decision or personnel policy. The use of a person's
sexual preference or orientation, or marital status," on the other hand, is prohibited "as a criterion
in personnel decisions." While the personnel guide does not elaborate on the distinctions between
"employment decisions," "administration of any personnel policy" and "personnel decisions," it
states that the equal opportunity policy "applies equally to all aspects of employment at AT & T,
specifically including ... benefits .... "
Id. at 1067-68. The court also mentioned AT & T's Equal Opportunity Reference Guide as follows:
Like the Personnel Guide, the E.O. Reference Guide states that it is AT& T's policy to "prohibit the
use of a person's sexual orientation or martial status as a criterion in personnel decisions,".. .[and]
also promises that AT & T will administer "benefits and compensation.., for all employees and
applicants without unlawful discrimination on the grounds of: ... marital status [or] sexual orientation."
Id. at 1068.
[Vol. 27:2
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against her by not paying a death benefit routinely paid to surviving family members.7"
The District Court upheld the decision of AT & T's Employees' Benefits Committee to
deny Rovira and her children dependent benefits under theAT &Temployee benefit plan
and granted AT & T's motion for summary judgment.79 The court ruled that Rovira and
herchildrendid not fitthedefinitionofbeneficiaries as defined undereitherthe employer's
benefit plan or as defined in an ERISA-covered pension plan.'
Gay Teachers Association v. Board of Education of the School District of New York:
Medical Benefits Revisited
In another New York case, Gay Teachers Association v. Board of Education of the
SchoolDistrict of New York,81 the plaintiff alleged that denying health benefits coverage
to his domestic partnerwas discrimination based on marital status.82 This plaintiff argued
that the employer's denial of benefit coverage to same-sex partners of employees vio-
lated a city statute and a school board policy which prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 3 On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
found that the trial court had improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and
remanded the case." The outcome of this case could provide some indication as to
whether New York courts are ready and willing to require public employers to provide
employment-linked benefits to the same-sex partners of gay and lesbian employees.
Vermont Labor Relations Board: Medical Benefits Granted
Some gayand lesbian employees have been successful in securing benefits for their
same-sex partners through administrative channels. 5 The Vermont Labor Relations
Board recently ruled that the University of Vermont had to provide medical benefits to
the same-sex partners of employees. 6 The unnamed gay and lesbian employees argued
that the employer's denial of benefits to their same-sex partners discriminated against
them on the basis of sexual orientation because the University extended those benefits
79 Id.
79 Id. at 1072.
wD Id. at 1071-72. "To establish that they have standing to bring this claim under ERISA, plaintiffs must make out
a 'colorable' claim that they are beneficiaries under the Plan because they are or will become eligible for Sickness
Death Benefits underthe terms of the Plan." Id. See supra note 76 (definition of a beneficiary under AT&T's ERISA-
covered plan).
81 585 N.YS.2d 1016 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
Id. at 1016.
See Domestic Partners 1991, infra note 210, at 5. See also Elbin, supra note 7, at 1079-80.
'4 Gay Teachers, 585 N.Y.2d at 1016.
LS See, e.g., Bowman & Cornish, supra note 25, at 1177.
- B.M., S.S., C.M., & J.R. v. Univ. of Vt., Vt. Labor Relations Bd. No. 92-32, 16 V.L.R.B. 207 (1993)(available
from the Vermont Labor Relations Board, Montpelier, Vermont).
Fall, 1993]
11
Averill: Desperately Seeking Status
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994
AKRON LAW REVIEW
to the spouses of their heterosexual colleagues who are legally married.8 7 Relying on
Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act, the Board ruled in the grievants'favor 8
The Board ordered the University of Vermont to cease and desist from its blanket
refusal to provide medical and dental plan coverage for the same-sex partners of
gay and lesbian employees. 9 In reaching its decision, the Board relied heavily on
a nondiscrimination policy published in the University's Officer's Handbook."°
The Board also cited language from the University President's Equal Opportunity
Policy Statement.9
17 Id. at 207.
U Id. "The Fair Employment Practices Act, 21 V.S.A. §495 et seq.("FEPA") prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation." Id. 21 V.S.A. §495 (1992) provides in pertinent part:
a) It shall be unlawful employment practice, except where a bona fide occupational qualification
requires persons of a particularrace, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, ancestry,
place of birth, age or physical or mental condition:
(1) For any employer, employment agency or labor organization to discriminate
against any individual because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
sex, sexual orientation, place of birth, or age or against a qualified handicapped
individual;
(2)For any person seeking employment or for any employment agency or labor
organization to cause to be printed, published or circulated any notice or advertise-
ment relating to employment ormembership indicating any preference, limitation,
specification or discrimination based upon race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, sex, sexual orientation, place of birth, age or handicapped condition.
Id.
89 Id. at 221.
9' Id. at 210. The Board referred to the University's Officer's Handbook in pertinent part as follows:
The employer has a non-discrimination policy contained in the Officer's Handbook which provides,
in part, that: Applicants for.., employment ... are hereby notified that the University of Vermont
does not discriminate on the basis of... sexual orientation.., in admission or access to, or treatment
or employment in, its programs and activities.
Id.
91 Id. at 211. The Board relied on the University President's statements as follows:
Employer President George Davis issued a document entitled Affirmative Action/Equal Op-
portunity Policy Statement, University of Vermont, September 1, 1991 - August 31, 1992,
which provided in pertinent part as follows: ... The university of Vermont is doubly obligated
to express and demonstrate its commitment to Equal Employment and Educational Opportu-
nity for all persons in our community, regardless of irrelevant factors such as . . . sexual
preference... [or] marital status .... In order to be effective, Equal Employment Opportunity
will affect all employment practices including ... compensation.
[Vol. 27:2
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Citing Griggs v. Duke Power" and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio,93 the Board
relied on the "disparate impact theory" as the rationale for its decision.95 The Board held
that the employer violated its own policy by providing health benefit coverage to the
spouses of its married employees, while denying the same coverage to the same-sex
partners of its gay and lesbian employees.9 6 The Board also held that the university's
action was discriminatory because the university had not demonstrated that the practice
was related to job performance or a business necessity.97 The practice had a negative
disparate impact on gay and lesbian employees. 9 The Board ordered the University to
immediately develop and implement a revised medical and dental plan providing cov-
erage, which would not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 9
In response to this decision, Middlebury College, another Vermont school, has
recently offered employment-linked benefits to the same-sex partners of the college's
gay and lesbian employees. 100 This type of local response suggests that administrative
rulings can have immediate impact on those within the jurisdiction of the administrative
- 401 U.S.424(1971). In Griggs the Courtheld that "The [CivilRights] Actproscribes notonlyovertdiscrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude [a protected class] cannot be shown to be related tojob performance,
the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
9 490 U.S. 642 (1989). In Ward's Cove the Court held that once an employee has shown disparate impact caused
by specific, identifiable employment practices or criteria, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the challenged
practices business necessity. Id. at 750.
91 16 V.LR.B. at 216. "Once the employee demonstrates that the employer practice causes a disparate impact on
a protected class, the practice is prohibited unless the employer can demonstrate that the practice is related to job
performance and consistent with business necessity." Id.
95 Id.
s' Id. at 220.
91 Id. See also Elbin, supra note 7. He writes:
Employer concerns over the cost of domestic partner provisions can be divided into two catego-
ries: the natural concem over any rise in employee compensation and the fear that benefits for
domestic partners will be relatively more expensive and difficult to administer than equivalent
spousal benefits....
... Some employers have shied away from coveting domestic partner benefits out of fear that
gay employees will enroll significant numbers of partners with AIDS. Gay employees have con-
stituted a minority of those taking advantage of domestic partner provisions, however, and gay
employees using the benefits have not been singled out as costing more than non-gay employees.
Id. at 1082.
" Id.
99 d at 221.
11 Available from the electronic Domestic Partnership Bulletin Board (domestic@tattoo.mti. sgi.com).MIDDLEBURY
DP BENEFITS, August 27, 1993. "Effective September 1, 1993, Middlebury College will extend the same benefits
to persons who meet the College's definition of a domestic partner that the College presently provides to spouses of
employees, to the extent provided by law." Id.
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agency; however, such decisions may have limited precedential value with other em-
ployers or in other states. 01
To date, case law regarding the granting of employment-linked benefits coverage
to gay and lesbian employees' same-sex partners has not been positive. However, gay
and lesbian employees have made some headway getting courts to accept a broader
definition of the family and thereby require employers in some circumstances to grant
leave and the payment of death benefits to employees' same-sex partners.' ° Hopefully
this body of case law will continue to grow and eventually a legal status which would
provide access to employment-linked benefits for the same-sex partners of gay and
lesbian employees will emerge. 03
PART II - WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY
Two cases which may open the way for the legal recognition of same-sex couples
are Braschi v. Stahl Associates Companyw4 and Baehr v. Lewin.'0 Neither case deals
specifically with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the workplace;
however, each case presents a departure from rulings against granting legal status to
same-sex couples. 1 The Braschi decision allowed a broader definition of the family for
eviction purposes.17 The Baehr' 8 case may result in a ruling which would allow same-
sex marriages, at least in the state of Hawaii."' 9
Braschi v. Stahl Associates: Redefining the Family
In 1989, the New York Court ofAppeals held that, as a matterof law, Miguel Braschi
could be considered Leslie Blanchard's family member and, therefore, not be evicted
from the rent-controlled apartmentthe couple shared fornearly a decade." 0 Braschi and
10 See CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, Er AL., THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 331 (1992). "In thinking about the
authoritative weight of administrative agency law ... regulations and decisions issued by administrative agencies are
primary authority... [but] the authoritative weight of a particular regulation or decision ultimately determined by
the legislature and the courts." Id.
12a See cases cited supra notes 28-84 and accompanying text.
"1 See Otis R. Damslet, Note Same Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RGTS. 555 (1993). "Efforts to secure
same-sex couples equal protection of the marriage laws are likely to continue until they prevail." Id. at 593.
0 74 N.Y.2d 201 (N.Y. 1989).
106 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
456 See cases cited supra notes 28-84 and accompanying text.
107 Braschi, 74 N.Y2d at 211.
10 Baehr v. Lewin 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). "It is the state's regulation of access to the status of married persons,
on the basis of the applicants' sex, that gives rise to the question whether the applicant couples have been denied the
equal protection of the laws in violation of article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution." Id. at 67.
159 See Reske, infra note 151 and accompanying text.
"' Braschi, 74 N.Y2d at 213.
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Blanchard lived together as permanent life partners and homosexual lovers from 1975
until Blanchard's death from AIDS in 1986. 1 The two men held themselves out as a
couple and were regarded by others as a couple." 2 The couple shared all obligations
including a household budget, joint checking and savings accounts, and joint credit
cards."' Blanchard executed apowerof attomey so Braschi could make all the necessary
decisions for Blanchard during his illness."4 Braschi was the named beneficiary of
Blanchard's life insurance, as well as the primary legatee and co-executor of Blanchard's
estate." 5
After Blanchard's death, Stahl Associates commenced eviction proceedings against
Braschi pursuant to New York's Rent and Eviction Regulations." 6 Braschi initiated an
action seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin Stahl from evicting him until a court
could determine his right to protection under §2204.6(d) of the Regulations."' Braschi
alleged that as a member of Blanchard's family, he could not be evicted."" The Appellate
Division lifted a preliminary injunction, allowing Braschi temporary protection under
the statute. 119 In a plurality decision on appeal the court concluded that for protection
from eviction under §2204.6(d)' the term "family" should not be rigidly restricted to
those who have formalized their relationship by obtaining a marriage license or an
adoption order.'2' The court used a four-factor test to determine that Braschi and
Blanchard's relationship was sufficient to classify Braschi as Blanchard's family mem-
"I Id. at 206.
n12 Id. at 213.
113 Id.
114 Id.
I1 ld. at 206. The court relied on the New York eviction statutes as follows:
Hence, §2204.6 of the New York City Rent and Evictions regulations, which authorizes the issuance
of a certificate for the eviction of persons occupying a rent-controlled apartment after the death of
the named tenant, provides, in subdivision (d), non-eviction protection to those occupants who are
either the "surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's
family who has been living with the tenant [of record]."
ld. (emphasis added).
See also 9 New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations §2204.6(d), N.Y. UNCONSOL LAW (McKinney 1987)(rent
control regulation); 9 New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations §2520.6(o) N.Y UNCONSOL LAW (McKinney
1987)(rent stabilization regulations).
"7 Braschi, 74 N.Y2d at 206. "Respondent argues that since the relationship between the appellant and Blanchard
has not been accorded legal status by the Legislature, it is not entitled to the protections of §2204.6(d), which,
according to the Appellate Division, applies only to family members within traditional, legally recognized familial
relationships." Id.
11B Id.
119 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 521 N.YS.2d 563,563 (N.Y App. Div. 1988).
' See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121 Braschi, 74 N.Y2d at 213.
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ber under the statute."2 The court reasoned that the intended protection against sudden
eviction "should not rest upon legal fictions or genetic history, but should be based in the
reality offamily life."'2 3 The court also held that in the context of an eviction, "a more
realistic and valid view of the family would include two adult life partners whose relationship
was long-term and characterized by an emotional commitment and interdependence." t1
Some commentators have hailed the Braschi decision as the onset of a new direction
in family law.'25 They claim that the decision's precedential value enhances the likeli-
hood of success in legal actions nationwide in the areas of the law where same-sex
couples challenge traditional definitions of the family.l2 Other commentators are not
so optimistic about the Braschi decision's precedential value.12 These critics argue that
although the decision was a significant victory for same-sex couples, itwill carry limited
and unpredictable weight outside of the context of protection from eviction under New
York statutes. t21 These commentators reason that had the Braschi court relied on equal
protection grounds rather than statutory construction, the decision might have provided
more support for same-sex couples.129
'ld. at 212-13. See also Mary Patricia Treuthar, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of the "Family," 26 GONZ.
L REV. 91 (1990-91). She writes:
The court analyzed the Braschi-Blanchard relationship using a four-factor test: (1) the exclusivity
and longevity of the relationship; (2) the level of emotional and financial commitment; (3) the
manner in which the parties conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society; and
(4) the reliance placed upon one another for daily family services. Applying that test to "the reality
of the family life" of the pair, the court concluded that they were in fact members of a family.
Id. at 115.
" Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
124 Id.
12 See Charles-Edward Anderson, New Nuclear Family, 75 A.B.A. J. 20 (1989) (quoting Allen Ten, chair of the
ABA's Committee on the Rights of Gay People, "This decision signals the onset of a new direction of family law.").
'2' Id. See also Elbin, supra note 7, at 1086. He writes:
If society's interest in supporting marriage and the traditional family is founded on the desire to
promote the'emotional and financial commitment and interdependence' cited by the court in Braschi,
then society should be just as eager to support alternative relationships. The end result would be a
greater total number of stable families, both traditional and alternative.
Id.
127 See Mary F. Gardner, Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.: Much Ado About Nothing?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 361 (1990).
She writes:
Although Braschi has been hailed as a significant legal victory for same-sex couples, this Note
suggests that the case is likely to have limited and unpredictable precedential effect, both in New
York courts and nationally. The Braschi plurality was careful to establish a narrow context in which
couples can be considered 'family,' emphasizing that its definition of that term was fashioned to
further the legislative purposes underlying §2204.6 (d).
Id. at 381.
"I Id. at 361.
129 Id. at 3 84.
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The test of Braschi's precedential value in securing additional protection for same-
sex couples is yet to be seen. The court's willingness in Braschi to sanction a broader
definition of the family, even if only in a limited context, shows the judiciary's under-
standing of the need for the recognition and protection of same-sex couples. 110 If more
courts are willing to accept this broader definition of the family in situations other than
eviction cases, same-sex couples could be one step closer to securing benefit parity in
the workplace.
Baehr v. Lewin: Redefining the Family Revisited
On December 17, 1990, three couples applied to the State of Hawaii's Department
of Health for marriage licenses.131 The Department of Health denied the applications
because the members of each couple were of the same sex.3 2 The couples subsequently
filed an action against the Department of Health alleging that the Hawaii marriage
statute 33 is unconstitutional insofar as itis construed and applied tojustify the Department's
refusing to issue a license on the sole basis that the applicant couples are of the same
sex.134 The couples also alleged that they had met all marriage contract requirements and
provisions under the Hawaii statute,lt3 except that each couple was made up of applicants
13 See David Link, Notes and Comments, The Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments
of Same-Sex Couples, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1055 (1990). This commentator discusses the need for the courts to be
more sensitive to the needs of same-sex couples as follows:
The New York court in Braschi v. Stahl Associates utilized the most immediate interim solution to
the marriage problem -it recognized same-sex couples as de facto family members. This approach
offers several advantages. Particularly in cases like those in New York, where the party has not only
suffered the anguish of the loss of a life partner, but must also face an eviction proceeding with the
prospect ofa dramatically higher rent piled on to the already existing trauma of being forced to move
out of the home he and his partner shared, sometime for more than decade- in such cases a court's
sense of equities must and can run in favor of this survivor.
More important, though, is that it is a method by which the court can, if it wishes, open its eyes
to the facts of the relationship. Courts which permit a de facto analysis allow the facts effect. Such
courts are able to see that homosexual couples are bom into a system that was not designed to be
fair to them.
Id. at 1145.
131 852 P.2d 44,49 (Haw. 1993).
132 Id.
3 HAW. REV. STAT §572-1(3) (1992) provides that "The man does not at the time have any lawful wife living and
that the woman does not at the time have any lawful husband living" (emphasis added); HAW. REV. STAT. §572-1(7)
provides that "the marriage ceremony beperformed in the State by a person with a valid license to solemnize marriages
and the man and the woman to be married and the person performing the marriage ceremony be all physically present
at the same place and time for the ceremony" (emphasis added). See also HAW. REV. STAT. §572-6 (1992)(This
section of the statute makes no reference to the fact that the parties must be man and a woman.).
13' Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48-49.
" See supra note 133.
Fall,19931
17
Averill: Desperately Seeking Status
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994
AKRON LAW REvIEw
of the same sex.36 Finally, the couples alleged that the Hawaii Department of Health
violated their constitutional rights of privacy,137 equal protection,"8 and due process' 39
as guaranteed under the Hawaii Constitution.140
In a highly-publicized and controversial plurality decision the Hawaii Supreme
Court reversed the Circuit Court's decision 4" to dismiss the case for failure of the
plaintiffs to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 42 In a two-part holding, the
court concluded that the Hawaii Constitution'43 does not guarantee a fundamental right
to persons of the same sex to marry.'" The court also concluded that Hawaii's marriage
statute'" implicitly restricts the marital relation to male-female couples and thereby
establishes a sex-based classification which is subject to strict scrutiny'" in an equal
protection 41 challenge under the Hawaii constitution. 14 The court stated specifically
that "on its face and as applied, HRS §572-11'49 denies same-sex couples access to marital
status and its concomitant rights and benefits, thus implicating the equal protection
clause of article I section 5 [of the Hawaii Constitution].""s
Writing for the plurality, Judge Levinson compared the Baehr case to Loving v.
Virginia 5' in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down laws banning interracial
13 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44. "Applicants received a letter from the Department Director stating that the law of Hawaii
does not treat a union between members of the same sex as a valid marriage." Id.
I" HAW. CONST. art. I, §6 provides: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affimative steps to implement this right."
" HAW. CONST. art I, §5 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be
discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry."
139 Id.
11o Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44. The court held that sex is a "suspect category" for the purposes of equal protection analysis
underarticle 1 §5 of the Hawaii Constitution, therefore Hawaii Revised Statute §572-1 is subjectto the "strict scrutiny"
test.Id, at48. Under the "strict scrutiny" test the statute will be presumed to be unconstitutional unless it can be shown
that the statute's sex-based classification or interpretations are justified by compelling state interests and that the
statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights. Id.
141 See generally Damslet, supra note 103 (discussion of the lower court's opinion in Baehr v. Lewin).
112 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48.
14 See supra notes 137-38.
", Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
14 See supra note 133.
146 See supra note 140.
147 Id.
I" Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
"9 See supra note 133.
1so Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
1 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Henry J. Reske, Gay Marriage Ban Unconstitutional? 79 A.B.A. J. 28 (1993). In
an interview, William Rubenstein, director of the ACLU's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project said that he hopes laws
banning homosexual marriages would one day be looked back on with the same shock and horror with which people
now view miscegenation laws. Id. See also James Trosino, Note,AMERICAN WEDDING: Same-Sex Marriage and
the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93 (1993).
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maniages.'5 2 "With all due respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone era," Judge
Levinson wrote, "we do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate authority on the
subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may
mandate, like itornot, that customs change with an evolving social order."53 The Hawaii
high court remanded the decision and placed a heavy burden on defendant Lewin" to
overcome the presumption that HRS §572-1 is unconstitutional. 55 To prevail, the
defense must demonstrate that the statute furthers compelling state interests and is drawn
narrowly enough to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.'56 In the
past, Hawaii courts have allowed only public safety statutes past this strict teSt.157
On remand, this decision may guarantee same-sex couples the constitutional right
to many.5 8 The full impact of the Baehr decision will not be known until the case
completes the appellate process.'59 William Rubenstein, director oftheACLU's Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project, said that the Baehr ruling may be persuasive in other cases and
also may have practical effects outside of Hawaii because state laws generally provide
that"if you're married in one state you're married in another.""w The legal right to many
would afford same-sex couples the requisite legal status for coverage of spouses and
dependent children under employment-linked benefit plans.'6'
If, Baehr, 852 P2d at 62.
m Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
"' John C. Lewin was the defendant-appellee in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Public Health,
State of Hawaii. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48.
"" Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
156 Id.
's See For Gays, Wedding Bells May Ring, NEWSWEEK May 17, 1993, at 62.
's See Reske, supra note 151, at 28.
159 Id.
I Id. In general, marriages that are valid when contracted are valid everywhere with certain exceptions. See, e.g.,
Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E. 2d 206 (Ohio 1958). The court held that "[t]he policy of the law is to sustain
marriages, where they are not incestuous, polygamous, shocking to good morals, unalterably opposed to a well
defined public policy, or prohibited." Id. at 208. See also In re Loughmiller, 629 P2d 156 (Kan. 1981). The court
held:
The general rule with regard to the recognition of marriages solemnized elsewhere is that if the
marriage is valid where contracted, it is valid everywhere. Exceptions to that rule are (1) polyga-
mous marriages incestuous according to the principles of Christendom and (2) marriages prohibited
by the forum state for public policy reasons.
Id. at 158.
'61 See Beattie. supra note 53, at 1415. He writes:
The institution of marriage, for those who chose to enter it, affords special legal and social advan-
tages. The United State Supreme Court recognizes a fundamental right to marry, and courts care-
fully scrutinize state actions that may impinge on that right. Thus married couples can be secure in
the knowledge that the legal system supports and encourages their relationships.
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PART III: ALTERNATIVES
In an effort to give their relationships at least partial legal status, same-sex couples
have been taking advantage of any available legal alternatives162 which guarantee couples
some of the rights and benefits 163 automatically granted to married couples. "I In addition
to negotiating and litigating with government agencies and private businesses to have
their relationships recognized through the granting of employment-linked benefits to
same-sex partners, t6' some couples have attempted to formalize their relationships by
executing contracts and wills. 166 Others have lobbied for legally-recognized relation-
ships via domestic partnership, 167 guardianship,'6 and adult adoption. 69  Still other
couples opt to affirm their relationships in symbolic civil or religious ceremo-
'" See generally LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 25, at 377-474 (Chapter 5: Legal Recognition
of Lesbian & Gay Relationships). See also Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation in the Law, V. Same Sex
Couples and the Law, 102 HARV. L REV. 1603 (1989) [hereinafter Same Sex Couples and the Law] (discussion of
legal means by which same-sex couples can impose various forms of legal status on their relationships).
H, See LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 25 at 430-31. One commentator writes:
[Glay people have endeavored to create or receive some of the rights and benefits that are
automatically enjoyed by married couples [which] include: rights to spousal shares of marital
property upon death of one partner, tax benefits (including joint income tax returns, dependency
deductions, gift tax exemptions, and exemptions foralimony and property settlements); rights intort
law (including emotional distress, wrongful death actions, and loss of consortium); rights in crimi-
nal law (including immunity from compelled testimony and the marital communication privilege);
nonexclusion under zoning laws; visitation privileges in hospitals and other institutions; authority
to make decisions for an ill spouse; employee benefits for spouses (including health insurance,
medical leave, and bereavement leave); govemment benefits (including Social Security and veter-
ans payments to spouses, workers' compensation, [unemployment compensation] for those whose
spouses move for job-related reasons); lower fees for married couples (including automobile and
life insurance, family travel rates, and family memberships);immigration benefits; and draft exemptions.
Id.
14 See Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United
States, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 799, 874 (1979). She writes:
Given the legal, economic, and psychological benefits of marriage, it is not surprising that homo-
sexual couples who live in committed relationships would also wish to procure these benefits. A
number of homosexual couples have tried to effectuate a legal marriage, but to date no court has
recognized such a union.
Id. See also Beattie, supra note 53, at 1145.
665 See cases and administrative decisions cited supra notes 28-101 and accompanying text..
1 See infra notes 172-186 and accompanying text (discussion of how same-sex couples have used cohabitation
agreements and estate planning documents to formalize their relationships).
161 See infra notes 203-211 and accompanying text (discussion of how domestic partnership ordinances have
created some legal rights for same-sex couples).
166 See infra notes 187-192 and accompanying text (discussion of guardianship rights of same-sex partners).
16 See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text (discussion of adult adoption as an option for same-sex couples
to formalize their relationships).
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nies. 17° Nevertheless, these methods, jointly or severally, do not provide a result that
guarantees same-sex couples a legal status comparable to that of marriage. 171
Some same-sex couples use contracts such as cohabitation agreements to formalize
their relationships.' Marvin v. Marvin" was the landmark California decision which
upheld the validity of cohabitation contracts.1 74 The Marvin court held that two adults
who cohabit and engage in sexual activity are as competent as anyone else to contract
concerning their eamings and property rights. 175 Some courts still object to enforcing
cohabitation contracts if sexual relations are part of the consideration on which the
contract is based. 76 But in general, courts have been willing to uphold cohabitation
contracts between same-sex partners as long as they conform to state statutory and case
law requirements.'7"
Cohabitation agreements are a valuable tool when same-sex couples setup property
rights or other elements of their lives for which the couple wishes to contract. T7 Courts
also frequently use cohabitation agreements as evidence to establish the length and
commitment of a same-sex relationship. 179 However, a cohabitation agreement does not
lo See Rivera, Queer Law, supra note 18, at 373. She writes:
Many gay couples want to be legally married. They desire the symbolism and recognition of the
marital relationship, and the financial and legal benefits enjoyed by married couples. However,
marriages between persons of the same sex arenot legally recognized anywhere in the United States.
While many gay couples have been "married" in religious ceremonies,... these ceremonies do not
effect the couple's legal status.
Id.
171 Id.
" See Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L REv. 681,695-97
(1990).BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 260 (6th ed. 1990) defines: "Cohabitation. To live togetheras man and wife.
The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations which are usually manifested by married people,
including but not necessarily dependent on sexual relations."Id. "Cohabitation agreement. Contract between a man
and a woman who are living together in contemplation of sexual relations and out of wedlock, relating to the property
and financial matters of the parties." Id.
"7 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. 1976). The Marvin case set the standard that contract theory can govern the breach of
a cohabitation agreement when a meretricious relationship is not the sole consideration for the agreement. Id. at 819.
" See Zimmer, supra note 172, at 695.
175 Marvin, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
176 See Same Sex Couples and the Law, supra note 162, at 1624. "Modem courts have shown a willingness to enforce
explicit or implied agreements between unmarried heterosexual cohabitants defining the terms of their relationship,
so long as the consideration for the contract is severable from the sexual aspect of the relationship." Id.
'7' See Zimmer, supra note 172, at 695-97. "[Clarefully drafted contracts, conforming to state statutory and case
law requirements and executed by same-sex cohabitators, can resolve the issue of partnership rights." Id. at 696.
178 Id.
I 9 See Same Sex Couples and the Law, supra note 162, at 1611. "Generally, courtsthat haveprotected the rights of a gay
and lesbian couple have required proof that the relationship is sufficiently stable and close to constitute a family." Id.
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function like a marriage licensess° Even an artfully drafted cohabitation agreement is
likely to have little influence in the battle to secure employment-linked benefits forsame-
sex partners.' 81
Same-sex couples have succeeded in providing inheritance rights for partners with
wills and other estate planning documents.1n Without this kind of explicit protection,
same-sex partners have no intestate succession rights'83 and courts are reluctant to rule
for same-sex partners over family members. I" Some same-sex couples are also execut-
ing durable powers to designate who will make routine medical care decisions, act as a
guardian should one partner become incapacitated, select various treatment options, or
even authorize the termination of life support. Again, without this kind of explicit
designation as to who is authorized to make these decisions, courts are likely to allow
immediate family members to make these important decisions when the authority of an
undesignated same-sex partner is challenged."
18 See Zimmer, supra note 172, at 697. She writes:
But because this... contract is not recognizable by law as a marriage contract, it fails to address the
problem of creating a legal status for same-sex couples. Rights should not be premised on subor-
dinating the same-sex relationship, they should arise out of that relationship in the same way that
marriage rights arise out of the heterosexual relationship.
Id.
Id.
, See Zimmer, supra note 172, at 696. "[U]nless a same-sex couple explicitly outlines their intentions upon death
in contract or wills, they cannot establish inheritance rights." hi See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2105.15
(Anderson 1990) which provides in pertinent part:
A person of sound mind and memory may appear before the probate judge of his county and in
thepresence of suchjudge and two disinterested persons of such person's acquaintance, file a written
declaration declaring that, as his free and voluntary act, he did designate and appoint another, stating
the name and place of residence of such person specifically, to stand toward him in the relation of
an heir at law in the event of his death.... The rules of inheritance will be the same between him
and the relations by blood of the declarant, as if so bom.
Id.
See generally Albert H. Leyerle, The Ohio Designated Heir Statute, 21 AKRON L REV. 391 (1988) (discussion of
how intestate succession can be superceeded by statutory designation of heirs).
1 See Zimmer, supra note 172, at 697.
18 See Same Sex Couples and the Law, supra note 162, at 1625.
I Id.
1I Id. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 25. They write:
Many domestic partners would want their partner to be able to make medical decisions for them
in the event of their incapacity. In cases where an individual cannot make her wishes known, the
court will appoint a guardian to make decisions on her behalf. Typically, courts will favor a spouse
or blood relative as guardian. By executing a durable power of attorney, a domestic partner can help
to assure that her wishes will be followed.
Id. at 1209.
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One of the leading cases in this area is In re Guardianship of Kowalski.187 Sharon
Kowalski suffered severe brain injuries in an automobile accident.' These injuries left
her seriously disabled and in need of constant care. 189 At the time of her accident, Sharon
was living with her lesbian lover Karen Thompson.190 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court's decision and named Karen Thompson as Sharon's legal
guardiarn.191 The courtlegitimized the relationship by calling the couple"family ofaffinity."'l
Adult adoption is another method same-sex couples have used in their attempts to
legitimize their relationships. 93 Some same-sex couples have relied on adult adoption
to establish property and inheritance rights. 19 Usually the partner without inheritance
rights in a former family acts as the adoptee, while the partner who already has inher-
itance rights acts as the adopter. 95 This way one inheritable relationship is created
without destroying another.196 Currently, every state recognizes the inheritance rights of
an adopted child of an unmarried intestate decedent over those of the decedent's non-
immediate blood relatives.1 97 In addition, adoption becomes final at the moment of
execution and provides a secure mechanism for same-sex couples to assign property to
partners. 198 The availability of adult adoption varies from state to state.199 Some courts
have refused to grant adoption in cases where the parties to the adoption share a sexual
7 478 N.W.2d 790 (Mini. Ct. App. 1991).
13 Id. at 791.
189 Id.
"9D Id.
191 Id. at 797.
'Y' Id. In determining Karen Thompson's role as Sharon's guardian, the court held:
All the medical testimony established that Sharon has the capacity reliably to express a preference
in this case, and she has clearly chosen to return home with Thompson if possible. The choice is
further supported by the fact that Thompson and Sharon are a family of affinity, which ought to be
accorded respect.
Id.
"7 See Zimmer, supra note 172, at 688-92.
" Id.
" Id. at 689.
196 Id.
"7 See Libby Post, The Question of Family: Lesbians and Gay Men Reflecting a Redefined Society, 19 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 747, 755 (1992). She writes:
Only spouses or specific blood-related family members can be designated as beneficiaries of social
security survivor benefits; lesbian or gay partners of social security recipients cannot receive sur-
vivor benefits upon the death of the recipient. Furthermore, because a lesbian or gay relationship
is not legally recognized, lesbians and gay men can not even designate their partners as beneficiaries.
For example, even where the partner of a gay man, who subsequently dies of AIDS-related com-
plications, is the primary caretaker during his partner's illness, the surviving partner is still denied
survivor benefits.
Id. (emphasis added).
"7 See Same Sex Couples and the Law, supra note 162, at 1626.
"7 Id.
Fall,1993]
23
Averill: Desperately Seeking Status
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994
AKRON LAW REVIEW
relationship, while others have ruled that when statutes do not specifically limit adoption
to children the sexual element of the relationship is irrelevant.3 Most commentators
agree that adult adoption does not provide the appropriate method to achieve the legal
status sought by same-sex couples."m' Adult adoption and all these other legal mecha-
nisms do not eliminate the need for a more comprehensive means by which same-sex
couples can define partners' rights. 20
A legislative mechanism which can serve to legitimize same-sex relationships is
domestic partnership ordinancesm 3 Local lawmakers have instituted these statutory
provisions inmany municipalities and also in fourstates. 5 Theselaws requirecouples
to register with the designated local office as domestic partners.2 A written application
is required on which the couple is asked to describe the details of their relationship.2 7
I See Zimmer, supra note 172, at 691 n.49-50.
2" See Zimmer, supra note 172, at 691.
Id.
In response to the tumultuous changes in the American family, a legal redefinition of both family
and marriage must follow. Courts can no longer accept "fictitious legal distinctions" to draw
arbitrary lines between who qualifies as a legal family and who does not. ... Because the state has
not established legal mechanisms to deal specifically with same-sex couples, it must open marriage
to tham. Their alternative legal options cannot survive.
Id. at 706.
See also SAME SEX COUPLES AND THE LAW, supra note 162.
In making a [determination of the status of a gay or lesbian relationship].... courts have
considered factors such as interdependence and the quality of the relationship. Although preference
to an outright rejection of their claims, this requirement places an unjust burden on gay men and
lesbians in long-term relationships because, unlike their married heterosexual counterparts, they do
not have the automatic protection through marriage.
id. at 1611.
1 See generally Bowman & Cornish, supra note 25 (full discussion of the current status of domestic partnership
ordinances in the United States). See also Link, supra note 130, at 1146-50; Kate Latimer, Domestic Partners and
Discrimination: The NeedforFairEmployment Compensation, 12 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 329 (1992) (general
discussion of the legal implications of the Minneapolis domestic partnership ordinance).
See LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 25.
2_ Id.
See Link, supra note 130, at 1147.
Id. at 1147. One commentator used the Los Angeles domestic partnership ordinance as a model as follows:
The definition of domestic partnership proposed for the city of Los Angeles is typical:
Domestic partners are two persons who declare that:
(1) they currently reside in the same household, and have been doing so for the
previous 12 months;
(2) they share the common necessities of life;
(3) they have a mutual obligation of support, and are each other's sole domestic
partner,
(4) they are both over 18 years of age and are competent to contract;
(5) neither partner is married:
[Vol. 27:2
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These application forms typically require more detailed information than is required on
a marriage license application." The benefits resulting from a couple registering under
a domestic partnership law are very statute-specific.2 Under some domestic partner-
ship ordinances access to employment-linked benefits are guaranteed for specific cat-
egories of employees.210 According to one commentator:
There is no question that domestic partnership begins as an inferior solution
to the marriage problem, a"separate butequal" status for yet anothergroup
of people disenfranchised from the majority... [but] equally important...
is the fact that domestic partnership is a method by which gay and lesbian
couples may declare publicly their intentions and obligations toward one
another in a legally significant way.21'
(6) neither partner is related by blood to the other,
(7) they agree to notify the appropriate agency within 30 days if any of the above
facts change.
Id.
2 A marriage license application issued by the Portage County Court of Common Pleas requires that the parties
pay a $45.50 non-refundable fee; abide by a five day waiting period; both be 18 years of age; provide parental consent
ifeitherparty is under 18; prove residence in the county of one of the parties; and provide evidence of the termination
of any prior marriage if any.
A domestic partnership statement from the University of Chicago requires that the parties attest to the fact that they
are each other's sole domestic partner and intend to remain so indefinitely, are of the same sex and neither is married,
are at least 18 years old, are not related by blood to a degree of closeness that would prohibit marriage in the state in
which they reside, are jointly responsible for each other's common welfare and shared financial obligations as
designated by three of the following: domestic partnership agreement,joint mortgage or lease, designation of partner
as life insurance beneficiary, designation of domestic partner as will beneficiary, durable property and health care
powers of attomey,joint ownership ofmotorvehicle,joint checking account, orjoint credit account. The couplemust
also promise to notify the University if there is any change in status of the domestic partnership such as residence
change or partnership termination.
m See Link, supra note 130, at 1147. "Because domestic partnership is not a marriage, it does not automatically
entitle the partners to established statutory benefits." Id. He also writes:
The contract of domestic partnership can be used in a variety of contexts: to secure employment
benefits; as a private contract between the partners; to qualify partners for the family discount on
insurance policies, or at private institutions such as health clubs. Regardless of the context in which
such contracts would be used the partners have created documentary evidence of their relationship.
Id.
210 See, e.g., DOMESnC PARTNERS/NON-TRADMONAL FAMILY RECOGNITON IN CAMPUS BENEFIT POLICIES
SURVEY, Lesbian and Gay Families Project of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute, (1990);
Loralie Van Sluys, Domestic Partners and Employee Benefits, Hewitt Associates (1991) [hereinafter Domestic
Partners 19911. See generally Bowman & Cornish, supra note 25. See also Available from the electronic Domestic
Partnership Bulletin Board (domestic@tattoo.mti.sgi.com) NEWEST COMPANIES LIST, August 19, 1993 (complete
listing of all public and private sector United States and Canadian employers which provide domestic partner benefits
to employees); Atlanta recognizes gay couples, but no benefits, THE GAY PEOPLE'S CHRONIcLE, July 9, 1993, at 1.
"The city government will officially recognize unmarried couples who live together, including those of the same sex.
But a second measure extending benefits to city workers' partners was vetoed by Mayor Maynard Jackson." Ild.
21 Link, supra note 130, at 1149.
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If same-sex couples comply with all the legal alternatives described in this section,
they will still not hold a legal status that provides them all the benefits and entitlements
that a marriage provides. 212  Without some kind of blanket statutory or common law
status for same-sex couples, this piecemeal approach to common law and statutory rights
leaves these individuals atthe mercy of sometimes insensitive judges and law-makers.23
One commentator has said,
Society must recognize that lesbians and gay men have the same overriding
need and concern for the protection of family members as do married
heterosexual couples ... [so] [c]onsequently, the goal of the gay andlesbian
community today is to expand the meaning of 'family' so that lesbian and
gay families are protected in the same ways as heterosexual families.214
PART IV: REALITY CHECK
Same-sex couples make up a growing percentage of the families in the United
States.215 In 1988, U.S. census officials estimated that there were 1.6 million unmarried
same-sex couples living in the United States. 216 All over the world, these couples are
actively pushing the legal mechanisms available to gain recognition for their relationships.2 t"
For example, Elizabeth Clinton, a nurse in a Canadian hospital, recently brought an
action before the Ontario Human Rights commission when her employer denied health
benefits coverage to her same-sex partner, Laurie Ann Mercer.218 When asked why the
couples decided to go ahead with the action Laurie said, "We didn't go into it because
21 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. See also Same Sex Couples and the Law, supra note 162. A specific
example would be as when a will fails. One commentator writes:
Intestate succession laws generally provide that a portion or all of a deceased's assets go to the
surviving spouse. Such statutes are based on fairness to the surviving spouse as well as the desire
to prevent s surviving spouse from becoming a public charge. These rationales apply to domestic
partners as well .... But cities clearly would be preempted by state law from passing an intestate
succession law to protect surviving domestic partners.
Id. at 1208.
2 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
214 See Post, supra note 197, at 748.
2' See Bowman & Comnish, supra note 25, at 1165 n.5. See also Patrick Rogers, How Many Gays are There?,
NEWSWEEK, February 15, 1993, at 46. "Most recent studies place gays and lesbians at somewhere between 1 and
6 percent of the population." Id.
216 Id.
217 See cases cited supra notes 28-84 and accompanying text..
218 See Peter Edwards, Gay Spousal Benefits a "Must," Human Rights Commission Rules, TORONTO STAR, August
4, 1993, at A2.
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we're gay activists... we did it because we wanted to set things up for our lives." 9 Like
many gay and lesbian couples, Laurie and Elizabeth have made the decision to set their
lives up as a family.2 ° They bought a condominium together in 1988.221 They intermingled
their financial affairs, shared credit card accounts, and executed wills that name each
other executrix and major beneficiary.tm They even hope to bring a child into their family.2
Many same-sex couples are being denied the basic rights married couples take for
granted just because they are both women or both men.3 This couple was successful
in arguing that Laurie was entitled to the same spousal benefits that heterosexual couples
employed by Elizabeth's employer receive.2 The Commission's board of inquiry
accepted the couple's argument that the only difference between Elizabeth and Laurie's
relationship and a heterosexual marital or common law relationship is that one of them
is not male.2 Unfortmately, many same-sex couples do not win this battle.
Active legal discussion of this issue began in the 1970's, and at that time one
commentator wrote:
Because this area of the law is so young and so fragmented it has not been
possible to find broad rules which cut across all the areas involved... [and]
at aminimum,judges... [and] attorneys need to examine theirhomophobic
attitudes and the many popularly held myths and stereotypes... [and] only
after such a reevaluation of judicial and societal attitudes can our legal system
begin to achieve a fair and equal application of the laws to all persons.227
This discussion has continued and in a Spring 1993 law review article another commen-
tator wrote:
Efforts to secure same-sex couples equal protection of the marriage laws
are likely to continue until they prevail. [L]itigation of the issues enters its
219 Id. (emphasis added). In an interview the couple also said that they considered themselves "relatively quiet,
apolitical women" and found it somewhat daunting to take on such a big corporation. Id.
2W Id.
221 Id.
2n2 Id.
22 Id.
I See Melton, supra note 2, at 516.
2 See Edwards, supra note 218. Mark Leshner, a crown attomey who won full family benefits for his live-in partner
in a similar case a year ago, applauded the courage of this couple and criticized the government for not legislating
that all workers in the province should be entitled to employee benefits for their partners, "regardless of their sexual
orientation. Id.
Id.
See Rivera, supra note 164, at 948.
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third unsuccessful decade... [and] given the importance of marriage as an
institution... the validity of same-sex marriage is crucial to any consistent
understanding of equal protection of the laws and the freedom all persons
should be able to expect in making decisions about their own lives.3
CONCLUSION
Not until 1967,229 and after an extended legal battle could inter-racial couples enjoy
the full legal benefits of marital status anywhere in the United States.m Today, same-
sex couples face similar legal obstacles. An old Chinese proverb philosophizes, ifa canal
is dug, water will fill it.231 This means that when the time is right, things will happen
easily. For the time being, it appears that same-sex couples will have to keep "digging"
and continue their battle to convince judges and legislators that they are entitled to a legal
status that will grant them all the benefits, including employment-linked benefits, that
legally-manied couples enjoy.
American families rely on employment-linked benefits. These benefits are part of
an employee's total compensation package. They also provide families the security of
health care, retirement and other financial and emotional support. Same-sex couples
should be legally entitled to these same securities for their families.
The time has come for courts and legislatures to pull the legal status that same-sex
couples seek out of the tangle of emotional issues and prejudices which have often
caused judicial and legislative gridlockconceming decisions affecting same-sex couples.
The time has come for the judiciary and the legislature to get in step with reality and
recognize that anAmerican couple doesn'tonlyhave to be one man and one woman. The
canal is ready.
SUE NUSSBAUM AVERILL
See Dam slet, supra note 103 at 593 (emphasis added).
's Supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
See Trosino, supra note 153, at 93-94.
SOPHIE R. Su, A COLLECTON OF CHINESE IDIOMS, PROVERBS AND PHRASES wmI ENGLISH TRANSLATION
189 (1984); See also BEIJING FOREIGN LANGUAGES INSTITUTE, CHINESE-ENGLISH-FRENCH: A HANDBOOK OF
CHINESE JOURNAL TERMINOLOGY 470-71 (1987).
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